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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES.*

Operation and Interpretation.-Treatiseson statutory construction deal both with rules governing the operation of statutes as regards time and place and their relation to other acts,
particularly by way of repeal, and with rules by which the meaning of their language is ascertained. The two sets of rules
cannot always be clearly differentiated, for the -operation of a
statute may depend upon the meaning of its language, and the
ascertainment of the meaning of a statute may be affected, if
not controlled, by extrinsic rules of law in addition to what may
be gathered from grammatical interpretation and context.
Intcrpretationas a Judicial Funwtion.-It is the practically
undisputed Anglo-American view that interpretation is a specifically judicial function. In the American doctrine of the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional, this view finds its
most striking expression. In continental countries with written
constitutions, the constitution is supposed to be as binding upon
legislation as it is in America. But the equal conistitutional
status of legislature and judiciary makes it appear logical that,
since the legislature is first called upon to apply the constitution,
*A chapter of a treatise on the Elements of Law upon Which the writer

is engaged.
(207)
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the conclusion which it has reached, under its oath, as to the
meaning of any, provision, must be respected by organs subsequently called upon to apply the laws, and which are merely
co-ordinate and not superior to the legislature. The American
view that the legislative interpretation is not binding upon the
courts cannot rest upon the fact that no prior judgment can
bind a co-ordinate judiciary for, if so, the judicial judgment
would not bind the equally co-ordinate chief executive who has
the last word in the application of the laws. The American
view-apart from purely political considerations-can be supported best upon the theory that interpretation is a specifically
judicial function, which cannot be renounced in favor of the
prior action of a political body.
The history of the American federal constitution shows
that in view of the inevitable ambiguities of language, a power
of interpretation is a controlling factor in the effect of legislative instruments, and makes the courts that exercise it a rival
organ with the legislature in the development of the written
law.
Opposition to Judicial Interpretation.-In the history of
jurisprudence the recognition of this fact has led repeatedly to
the attempt on the part of the legislator to forbid the exercise
of the judicial power of interpretation.' In France particularly,
the independence of the judiciary of the old regime and its
antagonism to reform measures aroused the jealousy of the
revolutionary legislative organs and led to drastic attempts to
curb the judicial power of interpretation. Thus it was provided
by a law of August 24, 179o, that the judges should apply to
the legislative assembly every time they thought it necessary to
interpret a law, and subsequent legislation required the Court
of Cassation to ask for a legislative declaratory decree if the
lower tribunals persisted in ignoring the view supported by that
court. A legislator, subsequently himself a member of the Court
of Cassation, spoke of judicial interpretation (jurisprudence
des trib.neaux) as the most destestable of all institutions, and
' Stobbe, Deutsches Privatrecht,Sec. 26.
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of the legislature as the sole and true interpreter of laws. Robespierre said the term "jurisprudence des tribuneaux" should be
erased from the French language. The Court of Cassation was
to reverse only in case of flagrant violation of the law. In "8io
an author sought to distinguish formal violation of the law and
its erroneous application from incorrect interpretation, and condemned reversals on the latter ground as an abuse of judicial
power, but even at that early date he had to recognize the exercise of jurisdiction on that ground as firmly established. In
1837 the third decision of the Court of Cassation in overruling
the lower court was made binding, and its power of interpretation thus recognized by the legislature. The recourse to the
2
Thus the
legislature for declaratory decrees was abolished.
judicial power of interpretation triumphed in the long run. In
Prussia the attempt to forbid its exercise was even more shortlived. The experience of history thus shows that the judicial
function of interpretation is inevitable ,and will in the long run
always assert itself.
Legislative Interpretation.-Conversely,there are difficulties in the way of maintaining a legislative power of interpretation. Continental jurists recognize the possibility of authentic interpretations by which the legislator declares the true mean3
ing of a law by which courts are to be guided. Such authentic
interpretation has retroactive force (as a judicial interpretation has), and this was expressly declared in the .original draft
of the French Civil Code. It may be argued that so long as
interpretation is made in good faith, its inevitable retroactive
operation must be legitimate no matter from what source it
comes, while, on the other hand, an abusive exercise of the
power of interpretation is none the less unjust in its retroactive effect because it proceeds from a court. It is however
acknowledged by continental jurists that the power of authentic
'Giny, Mthode d'Interpretation.pp. 41-45. For a striking instance of
reference to the legislature in early English law see the Statute of Treasons
in question in Straford's
of 135o and the observations on the provision
Trial, Howell's State Trials. Vol. III, pp. xso6-xso8.
aSavigny, System. Se. 32; Unger, Austrian Private Law, See. 14;
Dernburg, Prussian Private Law, Sec. 17; Dernburg, German Civil Law
Sec. 6; Aubry and Rau, Droit Francais 1, Sec. 30.
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interpretation once recognized, its validity cannot depend upon
the good faith of its exercise, and that retroactive legislation
under the guise of authentic interpretation is valid simply because the soverign power to legislate retroactively cannot be
questioned. But all the arguments against retroactive legislation count in consequence against the power of authentic interpretation, which is in theory admissible only as an emergency
power, and the practical examples of which are rare indeed.
The French Act of June 21, x843, on the form of notarial acts,
referred to as an instance of authentic interpretation by French
writers, was in the nature of a validating act, such as American
legislative practice recognizes. 4 The real and permanent objection to authentic legislative interpretation is that interpretation
is an incident to the application of the law, and that the judicial
application of the laws should be independent. The universal
modern recognition of the independence of the judiciary as
essential to government by law, therefore, condemns the practice of legislative interpretation, and as a matter of fact it is
exercised only in very exceptional cases
In the history of the English law explanatory acts are not
unknown, so the Act of 1542 explaining the Statute of Wills of
154o, and the provisions in the Statute of Frauds and in the
perpetuating Act of 1685 explaining the Intestate Estates Act
of 1670; but modern Anglo-American jurisprudence is opposed
to legislative interpretation with retroactive effect. A legislative
act declaring for the future the meaning of an older act is equivalent to an amendment of that act, and any interpretative act
will be construed in this way, so the act of Congress of February
26, 1845,6 passed to counteract the decision in Cary v. Curtis.'
Pennsylvania, declares a prospective legislative direction to construe a statutein a certain way to be an unauthorized exercise of
' Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 2.
' The latest instance of French
April 13, 19o, reversing the judicial
separation of church and state of
Jeze in Jahrbuch filr iffendtl. Rccht.
5 Stat. L 727.
3 How. 236. (See io9 U. S. 238.

authentic interpretation is the Act of
interpretation of the act regarding the
Dec. 9, i9o5- as to this see, Gaston
x9o, pp. 495-497.
and 182 U. S. x. pp. 174-18.)
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judicial power by the legislature,8 and while this is an extreme
and untenable position, the decision is characteristic as an expression of the sentiment that even prospective legislation should
not take the form of authentic interpretation, and that interpretation is an exclusively judicial function.
Executive and Administrative Interpretation.-Where.a
statute depends for its execution and enforcement upon administrative action, executive interpretation is an important factor.
For, although ultimate judicial interpretation may be independent, yet much of statutory execution never goes through the
courts, and in the enforcement of criminal statutes a lenient
attitude of law-enforcing authorities ifiust as a rule be conclusive. German and French legislation is-overlaid by executive
instruction to an extent unknown in England and America, but
even in our jurisprudence the opinions of law officers advising
executive departments in many cases practically determine the
operation of statutes.
But this is true only of public or criminal legislation. Generally speaking, private law operates without executive intervention. Instructions to courts were not unknowif even in England at a time when governmental functions were not dearly
differentiated, and some early English legislation (e. g.; the
statute Circurnspecte agatis),9 appears in the form of a royal
instruction to justices. But in every modem constitutional
government the principle of the independence of the judiciary
forbids the intimation of any executive direction, and courts
are subject to the departments of justice merely with reference
to the purely administrative or executive side of their business.
Executive interpretation may, therefore, be said to play no part
whatever in the operation of private law.
Legal Science and Interpretation.-Where legal writings

and the opinions of jurists constitute an authoritative source of

law, this "legal science" will claim the field of interpretation
as well as that of reasoning from general principles. And where

the entire law purports to be codified all legal science will con*Titusville Ironworks v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627.
9;3 Ed. I. st. 4.
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sist in interpretation. Thus, legal science began in Rome with
the interpretation of the Twelve Tables, and both the jurisprudence of the Koran and that of the Jewish Talmud are
concerned almost exclusively with subtleties of interpretation,
which are made necessary by the stagnation of natural organs
of development.
Interpretation a Question of Law.-The question of the
interpretation of a statute is considered to be a question of law
and not a question of fact. Even in a will, which is the act
of an individual, it must often happen that actual intent is not
predicable; still more commonly must this be true of a statute
-which is the act of two concurring bodies, each composed of
many minds. 20 WXVere the legislator an individual, his intent
would not be ascertainable by direct examination, as this is
constitutionally inadmissible, and the practice of courts justly
excludes resort to debates, the effect of which upon the final
vote must be matter of speculation 1 1 or even resort to the
legislative history of one house, the proceedings of which are
not necessarily Inown to the other house.12
The legislative intent by which the language of a statute
is permitted to be controlled, is an inference from facts and
conditions of which a court may take judicial notice as part of
the public history of the times or of usages or understandings
prevailing when the act was passed; thus in the Income Tax
cases 13 the debates in the constitutional convention are freely referred to for the purpose of showing the meaning of direct tax
and excise, but the subsequent debates in the state conventions
and in the Federalist are equally referred to, showing that the
reference is not for the purpose of proving that the framers of
the constitution wanted particular words to be understood in a
Some Questions which are relevant to the validity of a will cannot
arise in a statute; so particularly there is nothing corresponding to the
reality of the aunimus teitandi; questions of seriousness of the transaction,
of fraud or duress may be eliminated, since the constitutional forms of
legislative action cannot be drawn in question in these respects..
3 z69 U. S. 6M
"Craies, Statute Law 122; 143 U. S. Soa
""157 U. S. s62-..
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particular sense, but to prove what the accepted meaning of the
words was at the time.
Legal Rules of Interpretation.-While it is a matter of
relative indifference and perhaps incapable of strictly logical
determination whether we should treat interpretation as a question of law or of fact, it is of the utmost importance to inquire
to what extent interpretation is governed by rules of law.
The usual aids to interpretation, notably the context of
language and the history of law and legislation, are found in
general rules of reason and logic which do not belong exclusively
to legal science.
There are other rules of interpretation for which there are
no precise parallels outside of the law. It is, thus, generally
held, that where a statute is adopted from another state, it is
adopted with the construction previously placed on it in that.
state.
Rules similarly precise and reliable are rare, if we except
the ordinary canons applicable to the meaning of certain words
(person, singular and plural, male gender) which are now commonly embodied in interpretation acts.
Strict and Liberal Construction.-There are general principles necessarily more vague which are nevertheless of the
utmost value and importance, above all the rule that penal
statutes are to be construed strictly, a rule sometimes criticized
as inconsistent with the duty of fair interpretation,1 4 but in
reality not irreconcilable with that duty and practically indispensable.
It is the absence of such a principle -which may enlarge the
judicial power of interpretation into a virtual power of legislation. Where the legislature permits the granting of a divorce
for cruelty or extreme cruelty, the effect of the law depends
entirely upon the strictness or liberality of its interpretation.
Judicial practice will determine the facilities for divorce, and
the unity of the law will depend upon this practice being harmonized as far as may be by the decisions of the court of last
" 215 U. S. 67%
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resort. In England the expensiveness of appeals makes the
decisions of judges practically final and the principle of interpretation .should, therefore, be settled by legislative enactment
or a less flexible term be chosen to designate the ground for
divorce.1 5
The principle of strict construction is applied to other than
penal statutes, so, to acts imposing taxes and to acts in derogation of the common law': Whei the English Act permitting
the wife or husband of a person charged with certain specified
offenses to be called as a witness either for the prosecution or
defense and without the consent of the person charged, was
construed as making the wife or husband competent but not
compellable to testify,' 6 the prevailing consideration was that
nothing short of an absolutely explicit provision should be
allowed to override an ancient common law privilege. But the
principle should not apply where the policy of the statute is
based upon a profound dissatisfaction with the policy of the
common law, and in that case express dauses superseding the
usual principle of construction are now and then introduced.
Principlesof Lcgislation as Principlesof Construction.-:.If
it be conceded that the presumable intent of the legislature
should be the principal guide of interpretation, yet in many
cases presumptions will be so equally balanced as to leave us
without any guidance on this basis. The following will serve
as an illustration. General principles of construction permit
qualifying rules of law of a subsidiary character (as e. g., relating to procedure, to disqualifications, to liability or to relief)
to be read into a statute, though not therein expressed,, while
it is also possible to give effect to a statute literally and to refuse
the applicati6n of these qualifying rules. Not uncommonly this
situation will arise: the legislature has expressed the"qualifying
rule by specific provision in a number of statutes, while in the
statute.under construction a similar provision is not found (e. g.,
provision for notice and hearing, for compensation, for official
liability, for relief against official action, etc.) How does the

"Report

of Royal Commission on Divorce, 19U2, p. 71.
" Leach v. Director. iQ12. A. C. 3o5.
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legislative explicitness in analogous cases affect the legislative
silence in the particular case? Should the courts argue that the
particular statute should be construed in the light of the general
legislative policy evidenced by the express provisions of other
statutes, or should they argue that a significance should be
attached to a failure to be explicit, where explicitness is otherwise common? Either of the two opposite contentions is equally
plausible. Under these circumstances the courts had better
abandon the attempt to guess at legislative intent, and assume
the task of independent construction. The guide to construction in such a case should be sound legislative policy. But the
question remains whether this policy should be gathered from
current legislative practice, or from what the court conceives
to be the true principle of legislation. Perhaps the first impression would be that the courts should subordinate their own
views to what they believe the legislature would have done had
their attention been directed to the point. But this view does
not do adequate justice to the legitimate place of the judicial
power in the development of the law. Legislatures have not
infrequently assumed extreme attitudes in the assertion of the
public interest and against the claims of private right. The
vindication of private right has then fallen to the courts through
the instrumentality of powers of construction. The remedial
side of administrative law has thus been built up almost entirely
by the judicial implication of a saving of private right in the
face of legislative silence. The legislature has been notoriously
remiss in developing this side of public law, believing that the
courts could be relied upon to safeguard private rights. Judicial
policy may in other words be in the development of legislation
as legitimate a factor as legislative policy. In America any
implication of judicial usurpation of power may be negatived
by pointing out that legislative policy is subordinate to constitutional policy, and that the courts act as guardians of the
latter in asserting their independence in construction. But the
exercise of judicial power has been equally independent and
equally indispensable in England. We shall, therefore, conclude, that in using the power of construction by way of legiti-
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mate implication, the courts should be guided by what appears
to them as a sound policy of legislation, and that they are
entitled to exercise an independent judgment for that purpose.
In the domain of private law, issues of this type are not very

likely to arise.
Statutory Rules of Interpretation.-Rules of interpretation are also fixed by statute, particularly by the general statutory construction acts of many states. The operation of these
acts is necessarily qualified. As all statutes are read in connection with each other, every new statute may be presumed to
have been enacted with reference to the interpretation or construction act, the application of which to the particular statute
rests upon its voluntary acceptance by the legislature in passing
the latter act. The interpretation act cann6t be imposed by one
legislature upon subsequent legislatures of precisely equal power
against their will, and the will of a later legislature not to be
bound by an interpretation act need not be explicitly expressed,
but may be implied from circumstances. The operation of an
interpretation act is, therefore, in itself, matter of construction.
Qualified Force of Rules of Interpretation.m-And the same
is true of every other rule or principle of interpretation or construction.1 7 There is a sharp difference in this respect between
wills and statutes. With reference to wills there are yielding
and absolute rules of construction; the latter would not yield
to an apparent.contrary intent of the testator, and the rule of
stare decisis applies to such rules.18 But no rule of statutory
construction .is a binding or absolute rule in that sense, and,
except with reference to the same statute, there can be no application of the rule of stare decisis. A court of last resort has
it always in its power to ignore rules of construction as being
contrary to the implied intent of the legislature in a particular
case, and from this point of view a question of interpretation.

,'Even the rule 'that a statute adopted
with the construction previously put upon
qualified operation. - It does not apply where
type, variously construed in various states.
226 Pa. 514.
-"ICox 327.

from another state is adopted
it in that state, is not of unthe act adopted is of a common
Valjago v. Carnegie Steel Co.,
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is much more like a question of fact than like a question of
law. It is this necessary qualification of rules of construction
that makes the ordinary case law on statutory construction so
unsatisfactory and inconclusive.
Rules of Interpretationand Judicial Precedents and Dicta.
-It is a mistake to treat statutory construction like other
branches of the common law, as a body of doctrine to be
gathered from particular precedents and judicial utterances; the
only proper method of approaching the problem is the inductive
one, gathering from the mass of decisions certain tendencies
and seeking to determine whether some of these tendencies are
strong enough to impose themselves upon courts by reason of
inherent fitness and necessity. The rule of strict interpretation
of penal statutes will from this point of view appear.as a principle of far greater value than the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. And .most
of the current maxims stated in textbooks and judicial decisions are of little value. Modem codes have wisely refrained
altogether from formulating general principles of construction.
Construction in the Absence of Ambiguity.-The common
cases of construction are those in which the language of a statute is capable of more than one meaning, but the most interesting problems of the extent of judicial power with regard to
the construction of a statute arise where its meaning, looking
merely to the language used, does not admit of controversy
and is not in any special manner affected by other statutes or
common law rules with reference to which any new statute
must be read. The question may arise whether it is legitimate
to depart from the letter of*the statue to carry into effect what
is presumed to have been the true legislative intent, or perhaps
even in order to develop a rule according to its spirit beyond
its legislative expression.
It is well to distinguish this kind of problem of statutory
construction from the question whether a departure from the
letter of a statute entails the nullity of acts done in disregard
of its terms. The courts in such a case determine merely the
consequences of the violation of a statute, and not the extent
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or effect of its application, ind they do not claim the power to
add to or detract from its terms.
Principle of Literalncss.-The starting point in questions
of construction must always be the principle of literalness,
according to which the legislator is presumed to, as in fact he
does, choose his words deliberately intending that every word
shall have a binding effect.lea Moreover, Unless the statute is
a pure statement of principle, its words will never be precisely
co-extensive with its reason, for conventional limitations and
definitions will take the place of flexible generic terms. If the
period of litimations is ten years, a day less will not avail the
possessor, and the closeness of the margin on the other side
will not save the owner, whatever the particular circumstances
may be; and if a will is required to be holograph the fact that
a date is printed may be fatal to its validity.
In such a case a liberal construction may possibly aid a
very slight defect by stretching or narrowing terms used by the
legislator to the utmost, by declaring a departure to be irrelevant, or some particular requirement to be merely directory;
thus in a holograph will a printed date may possibly be ignored,
in usury laws making seven per cent. per annum the maximum
legal interest a provision for semi-annual payment may be held
admissible, and the maxim "de mininis non curat lex" may
save trivial violations from criminal prosecution, but such relaxations do not amount to the acknowledgment of a principle
that precise measures are to be construed as satisfied by substantial approximations, so that cases on the border line shouldbe judged according to the equities of the particular circumstances, or that a waiver of rights which arise from literal
interpretation should be implied in equity. Certainly, no such
principle is recognized by the prevailing law.*
Conceding, however, the principle of literalness, the question will arise how to deal with cases of variance between legislative expression and presumable legislative intent, cases of
ior U. S.

irs. Strong quotes from Bacon's Abridgement: "A statute

ought upon the whole to be so construed that if it can be prevented, no
cause, sentence, nor word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.'
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legislative inadvertence, looseness, or lack of foresight, with
defects of expression, of thought, or of provision. Some typical instances will serve to illustrate these defects and the judicial
practice with regard to them.
Verbal Inuccuracies and Defects of Expression.-An obvious clerical error can be corrected by construction, as'e. g.,
the reference to a wrong date, 9 or to a wrong chapter-or
section number of a statute when the intended reference is
clear.20 Certain defects of expression are so common that the
judicial power with regard to them has become well established,
particularly the word "and" in a disjunctive sense instead of
the word "or".
But even such errors may be fatal to a statute imposing
a burden or a penalty. Cases may be cited where an obvious
inaccuracy has been corrected with the result of sustaining a
conviction;21 but such cases are rare; the power to substitute
"or" for "and" in a criminal case has been denied by a federal
court, 22 and very striking instances are found of a refusal to

give effect to obvious intent as against the faulty wording of
a revenue or penal statute where the effect would be to the
detriment of private liberty or property.
Thus a provision in an adulteration act "that no person
either by his servant or agent, or as the servant or agent of
another" shall sell, etc., is not permitted to be corrected by
judicial interpretation so as to include a person selling as principal, 23 and where an act punishes the fraudulent removal of
assets by specified officials or other employees of an establishment receiving on deposit the money of such (instead of: of
other, or, of any) persons, it is applied in accordance with theobviously unintended narrow scope of its literal terms.2 '
English Postponement of Payments Act, x914, referring to a prolama-

tion of August 3d, which was actually dated August .2d.
3*Lewis-Sutherland, Statutes, Sec. 412.
21"For every, violation of the first and second sections of this act"People v. Swatser, x Dak. 295; see also Haney v. State, 34 Ark. 26t.
n U. S. v. Ten Cases Shawls. 2 Paine 162. Fed. Cases No. 1644&
" State v. Squibb, i7o Ind. 4K 84 N. F. .
"State v. Traylor. Miss., 56, So. 521.
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The definition of a common towel as one intended or available
for common use by more than one person without being laundered after such use 25 could be given sense, if "each use" were
substituted for "such use," but the statute being penal, it is
extremely doubtful whether a court would make this correction.
Clerical errors in the final draft of a customs tariff act have
been acquiesced in by the Treasury Department, where the effect
of the wrong placing of punctuation or parenthesis was to relieve the importer from a duty concededly intended to be imposed.20 But the correction will be made if it will operate in
mitigation of a penal statute, so where the amendment to an
act forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons, by striking
out too many words from the clause specifying the legitimate
purposes, would on literal reading have left the statutory privilege of carrying weapons senseless."7
Defects of Thought.-It may be urged that a liberality of
construction similar to that applied to plain verbal errors should
be extended to obvious imperfections of thought, particularly
such as represent familiar types of mental lapse. The point is
controversial in the law of 'wills. If a testator gives to A for
life, and if A die without children, then to B, the inference is
almost irresistible that he meant to give to A's children if he
should leave any. A mere negative by way of exception may
perhaps legitimately support the implication of an opposite positive provision on failure of the excepted contingency, as a preference to the alternative of leaving a situation altogether unprovided for.
There are well-known English and American cases in which
the obvious intent of the testator has been permitted to prevail
in the absence of an expression of an intent, when according
to strict rules of construction intestacy would result. The
writer is not acquainted with any similar or analogous case in
the construction of statutes (where the equivalent of resulting
intestacy would be the continued application of common law
"Laws Virginia, z916, ch. 27&
'Re Schilling, 53 Fed. 81; Craies, Statute Law, p. 424.
Earhart v. State, 67 Miss. 325.
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rules), and the presumable scarcity of such cases, if any, attests
the care which is after all devoted to, the drafting of statutes.
Non-literal Construction.--Courts have not hesitated to
supplement or vary the text of a statute where a literal reading
would without any apparent reason have contravened settled
principles. Several states have undertaken to transform an
estate in fee tail into a life estate in the first taker with a remainder in fee simple to the succeeding tenant in tail. In the
statutes the latter is described as the person to whom the estate
would on the death of the first donee in tail first pass according
to the course of the common law. By construction, the -determination of the remainderman is controlled by the statute of
descent, and not by the common law, in order to avoid the
anomaly of reinstating the rule of primogeniture for that par28
ticular case.
A statute of Illinois provides that if a legacy is given to
a child of the testator, and the child dies before the testator
leaving issue, such issue in the absence of an express different
provision should take the legacy intended for the child, but if
no such issue survive the testator, the estate given by the legacy
shall be considered as intestate. The common law rule is that
if the legacy is specific or a stated amount,, and there is a residuary bequest, the lapsed legacy falls into the residue; and
since no explanation can be given why this rule should be departed from, it may be reasonable to construe the statute as
though the saving clause for the event of the non-survival of
issue were left out.
Restrictie Interpretation.-StatutesWhwther Controllable
by Equity.-The power of non-literal construction has been
chiefly urged for the purpose of reading into a statute unexpressed exceptions demanded by equity or by policy. It seems
to have been believed at one time that statutes could be con29
On this ground
trolled by established doctrines of equity.
3 0 and the operaexceptions were read into the statute of frauds,
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, Sec. z.i8.
See. "The Equity of a Statute." 58 U. or P.%. L REV. -6.
Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk 98, 374o.
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lion of registration or recording acts was qualified by the
equitable doctine of notice, 31 while in Virginia an early decision applied to the registration act of that state the maxim
that equity will not relieve against a statute.3 2 The judicial
restriction of the statute of frauds has subsequently been criticized, and it has been said that the former judicial practice can
no longer be justified now that statutes are enacted with a view
to equitable as well as legal doctrines ;33 thus the defective excution of a power of appointment is not 4aided where the execution
3
is controlled by a statutory provision.
Statute Whether Controllable by Established Policy.-To
support an implied exception on the ground of policy, the policy
ought to be one firmly established. The federal constitution
extends the judicial power of the United States to all suits arising under the laws and constitution of the United States, while
the Eleventh Amendment excepts from federal jurisdiction suits
brought against a state by the citizen of another state. It was
contended that a citizen might sue his own state on a cause
arising under the laws and constitution of the United States,
as a clear implication from these provisions. But the Supreme
Court considered the principle of non-suability of the state so
firmly established, that it would not permit its abrogation as
was therefore
a mere matter of inference, and an exception
35
read into the original clause of the constitution.
Perhaps the most striking instance of restrictive interpretation is found in connection with the Contract Labor Law of
x88 5 . The act forbids the bringing into the country of persons
under contract to perform labor or service of any kind, carefully specifying certain exceptions. By unanimous decision it
was held, that a minister of the church was not within the
spirit 'of the exclusion act, though not expressly excepted."
aLe Neve v. Le Neve, i Amb. 34&

Knight v. Triplet, Jefferson (Va.) 7-.
i876. 2 Ch. D. 291. 297.
Igoo, i Ch. 442.
"Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. i.
Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

The decision made much of the power and duty of a court to
interpret a statute according to its spirit and not according to
its letter; but in view of the fact that the implied exception
was in deference neither to an established policy nor to a strong
equity it would be most unsafe to rely upon this decision as a
precedent, and it is clear that a similar construction would have
been impossible if the result would have been to impose a
restriction or penalty instead of relieving therefrom..
Restrictive Interpretationto Preventa Murdererfrom Reaping the Benefit of His Crime.--The question of the judicial
power of restrictive interpretation has been particularly discussed in the cases in which an inheritance or devise-or dower
or the amount of an insurance policy was claimed by one who
had by murder caused the death which was the basis of the
claim. The doctrine that a devisee .is incapacitated by his crime
from taking the devise was first propounded in New York, 1
but subsequently the court shifted its ground and declared that
while the statute would have its operation in the first instance,
the wrong would be corrected in equity by preventing the devisee from retaining the fruits of his crime. 38 Here then the
court, after all, finally refused to read an unexpressed exception
into a statute in order to carry into effect a theory of natural

justice.
The question has since repeatedly come before American
courts, and by a very decided preponderance of authority they
have declared themselves to be without power to override a
plain statutory rule in view of conditions not foreseen or provided for by the legislature.3 9 A contrary view is taken in
Tennessee, 40 and in Missouri.4 1 In the latter case the power
of restrictive interpretation, the judicial -power to control the
" Riggs v. Palmer, i 5 N. Y. So6.
Ellerson v. 'Westcott. 148 N. Y. 149.
IlL i8o; 182 Ind. 289; 125 Ia. 449; 72 Kats...3; 41 Nebr. 6i,
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changing 3 Nebr. 6t; ioo N. C.24o; 53 Oh. St. 668; 17o Pa. 203; i8S S. W.

487 (Ky.).
"Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, a case of an insurance policy, not of a
statute.
e Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 6z.

224

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

letter of the statute by the spirit of the law, is claimed very
emphatically, but the decision merely serves to place in strong
relief the general unwillingness of courts to assume a similar
responsibility. Obviously, the controlling difference between
this class of cases and the Trinity Church case 42 is that in the
latter the effect of liberal construction was purely relieving and
beneficial, while in the inheritance cases it would be to impose
a forfeiture.
Extensive Interpretationand Analogy.-Analogy is one of
the main pillars of the. common law. For it means after all
merely that principles recognized in the administration of justice should be carried to their legitimate consequences wherever
they are applicable. The rejection of an analogy means either
a differentiation in principle. (showing that the claim of analogy
has no basis), or it stamps the rule of the common law which
the court refuses to extend as one based upon authority only,
and not on reason or principle.
Analogy may be said to enter into the application of statutes in so far as a statute leaves room for the operation of
common law principles. It is true that where a statute extends
a relation already subject to common law rules, there is no
need to resort to analogy; thus it goes without saying that if
a statute introduces adoption, the ordinary -rules of the law of
parent 'and child as to custody, services and support apply, and
if copyright or patent are recognized as species of property,
they become-subject to the law of wills and administration. But
a real .instance of analogy seems to be furnished where legislation introduces absolute divorce in addition to, or in place of,
separation from bed and board; in that case it seems proper to
accept by analogy the defences of-condonation or recrimination,
as has been done by American courts.
Where a statute imposes upon an employer the duty to give
to -a discharged eiployee a card stating the reasons for the
discharge, it may be legitimate to apply by analogy the defence
of privileged communication developed in connection with the
- Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., supra, note -36.
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law of libel, and the denial of that defence by an. American
court may justly be questioned. 43 In these cases the statute
creates a relation so like a common law relation that since the
new relation must be governed by some principle, the common
law principle should be applied; the only alternative is to. contend that a statute must be read without reference to outside
rules of law, which in the clearance card case would mean that
there could be no liability even for a malicious assignment of
an unfounded charge.
Abrogation of Common Law Rules by the Spirit of New
Legislation.-A problem closely allied to that of analogy is
created by the fact that statutes may change common law relations so radically, that beyond the scope of the express statutory provision the continued application of the common law
would be inconsistent with the spirit of the newly created relation. Thus married women's acts have rarely undertaken to
deal comprehensively with the relation of husband and wife, as
logically affected by making the married woman capable of
holding property and contracting; they do not always speak of
the relation of the husband to the wife's torts, of the estate by
entirety, or other kindred matters. If the courts hold common law rules abrogated by the spirit of the new statute-and
it should be observed that authority is much divided upon the
point-they do not construe the meaning of the statute, but
deal with the common law and with the controversial problem
whether rules of the common law disappear where their reason
no longer holds (cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa). On the
basis of the altered relation a court may go so far as to eliminate an existing spdcial rule of law, but it can hardly create new
obligations not previously existing. Thus it has not been suggested that the new rights of a married woman impose upon
her new duties of support, but correlative positive obligations
of this kind can only be recognized if created by legislation.
General Exclusion of Analogy.-The true problem of
analogy may be stated this way: a statute has altered common
"St. L & S. W. R. Co. v. Griffin, 154 S. W. 583 (Texas).
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law principles with reference to one relation; another relation
not covered by the terms of the statute involves the same or
similar principles: can the new. relation be said to be within the
spirit though not within the letter of the statute? The principle of literalness stands in the way, or, to put it in another
way, most statutes deal with principles only in the form of rules,
and a principle is flexible while a rule is not. The law of prescription is in America common law and expresses a principle
with regard to easements analogous to the principle involved
in the statute of limitations which applies to corporeal hereditaments; the traditional period of the statute of limitations having
been twenty years, such is also the common law period of prescription. If the period of limitation is by statute reduced to
fifteen years, the courts correspondingly reduce the time for prescription. 44 But if the period of prescription is fixed by statute,
as it is in England (1832), it does not alter automatically by
a reduction of the period of the statute of limitations from
twenty to twelve.45
It would probably be accepted as an undisputed proposition
of English and American law that statutes are not extended
by analogy. A statute of Massachusetts provides for the apportionment of income between a tenant for life and a remainderman ;46 the courts will not extend this rule so as to apportion
between personal representatives and heirs--a relation closely
analogous. 47 Courts would take the position that such extension was not interpretation but judicial legislation. Where extensive interpretation has been undertaken, it has taken the
form of stretching the meaning of words. The Twelve Tables
gave a cause of action for cutting down trees; this was interpreted
as including vines: extensive interpretation, to be sure, but not
application of a statute by analogy, which implies a much
greater attitude of independence toward the written law than
would have been thought possible in the early stages of the
- Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. So3.
" English act of 1874.
" Rev. L Ch. 141, See- 24, 25.
0 Dexter v. PhillipS, 121 Mass. 178.
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Roman Law. A Nebraska statute avoids testamentary gifts to
subscribing witnesses (thereby saving the will); this was interpreted as meaning attesting witnesses, thus extending the application of the statute to nuncupative wills. 4 Some courts have
accomplished the more difficult feat, in the same type of statute, of including under the term witness the husband or wife
of the witness by reason of the unity of interest, 49 but other
American courts have justly declared this to be impossible,5
and the object was attained by an amendment of the statutes
in question. When in Illinois the courts extended the absolute
right of the widow to share in her deceased husband's estate
beyond the terms of the statute, they relied less upon the con'struction of a particular statute than upon "a sort of common
law" that had grown up in the state in harmony with an entire
course of legislation.5 1 It is characteristic that leading English
and American treatises on statutory construction do not even
refer in their indices to the term "analogy", and the few cases
in which the terms of a statute have received an extended application beyond their possible literal meaning, are dearly exceptional or anomalous; 52 there is no doctrine in this respect coinparable to the doctrine that implied exceptions may be made
from a statute on the ground of equity or to harmonize it with
common law principles. If certain old English statutes have
been extended beyond their terms in ways which would now be
thought impossible, this must be attributed to the fact that
statutes at that time were occasionally drawn with great looseness, and the line between royal and legislative power not clearly
observed, so that a specific authorization by Parliament served
as a warrant fQr a general alteration of judicial practice.
It has been said that the judge-made rule of law which
creates a presumption of death from seven years's absence unaccounted for, can be traced to the establishment of such a pre'Godfrey v. Smith, 73 Neb. 756
fDecisions of Maine and New York, see
1o6 Mass. 474, 150 InL 253.
"Taylor's Will, 55 I1L m.

"See Lewis-Sutherland, 587-599.

25

Me. 493; 1 Johns. Cas. 16.
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sumption for specific cases by statute;53 but according to common law doctrine this is not an extension of the application of
a statute by construction, but a development of common law
upon the model of legislation; just as the period of prescription
follows the statute of limitations. In an early case indeed the
seven year statute was applied by analogy to persons "within
the equity" though not within the strict letter of it. 54 This was
true extension by analogy, but the case was almost within the
letter of the statute.55
Evasion of Statute by Keeping Out of Its Letter.-In certain cases it might be urged that an analogous extension of
statutes is demanded in order to prevent fraud. The type of
cases is that a statutory prohibition is circumvented by adopting an equivalent arrangement not covered by the terms of thestatute. E. g., the law forbids a married woman to dispose by
will of more than one-half of her personal property without
her husband's consent ;56 the married woman makes a gift mortis causa of substantially all her personal property; this is held
not to be within the prohibition of the statute.Y A general
doctrine making fraud upon statutory rights illegal would cover
this point, and substantially would in many cases lead to an
analogous extension of statutes; but there is no such doctrine
known to our law, or in other words, it is considered legitimate to evade, if possible, the effect of a statute, by keeping
outside of its terms, although what is done violates its spirit. 8
There is. thus, no question that a collateral inheritance tax.
statute can be evaded by making gifts though in contemplation
"-ig Car. 11, c. 6; Thayer's Prelim. Treatise on Evidence, pp. 319-324.
"Holman v. Exton. Carth., 246, 1692.
"The rule that statutes will not be extended by analogy was carried
to an extreme and unreasonable length when it was held that an act
providing that a child bQt. to testator after the making of his will without
providing .for such child, should succeed to his intestate portion of his
father's estate, could not be applied to the mother, after married women
had been'enabled" to make wills. Cotheal v. Cotheal, 4o N. Y. 4o5. To
construe father as meaning parent would have been within the legitimate
bounds of judicial power, although the Court denied this. Two judges
dissented, and the General Term had reached the opposite conclusion. See
also Roton's Will, 95 S. C. 11S, 78 S. E. 711 (widow including widower).
J Massachusetts General Statute. Chap. ioS, Sec. 9.
" Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen 43.
" Craies Statute Law, pp.. 75-7.
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of death, if these are not covered explicitly. A considerable
part of the art of drafting statutes consists in anticipating
attempts at evasion and providing against them by sufficiently
comprehensive language.
A statute of Kentucky undertakes to guard against this
kind of evasion by providing that no trick, device, subterfuge
or pretence shall be allowed to evade the operation or defeat
the policy of the law against selling intoxicating liquors without a license,59 and the courts have succeeded in holding that
sales made across the border should be treated as having been
made in reality within the state;6O but these decisions did not
perhaps exceed the legitimate bounds of construction."
Courts would probably decline to travel far beyond the letter
of the statute to supplement defects of legislation.
Analogy and Codificaion.-The French law offers some
very striking instances of the development of code provisions
on the basis of analogy. Thus Article 1423 of the Code Civil
authorizes the husband to dispose by will of his share of the
community property; the like authority is accorded to the wife
by French "jurisprudence." 62 Article io9 of the Commercial
Code allows purchase and sale to be proved by witnesses in the
discretion of the court; judicial practice has extended this to
commercial transactions generally.6 The Commercial Code
makes bills of exchange negotiable; in practice negotiability is
extended to other securities."
This may be attributable in part to the peculiarly lapidary
style of the French codes; note e. g., the phrase "en fait de
meubles possession vaut fitre" which demands supplementation
by construction. But generally speaking, it may be contended
that principles of interpretation which are suitable to statutes
in a system of unwritten law are not necessarily applicable to
"Statutes 1894, Sec. 257.
a 127 Ky. 48o, 188 S. W. 332,

"See

3398.

i21 Ky. ft
Dalloz Code, Sec. z423, note ig; Beaudry XIV, No. 47.
Beaudry Obligations, No. 2s54 Sq., 2575.

"Lyon.Caen IV, is&
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a code;05 for a code is apt to lay down principles rather than
rules, and if a code abrogates the older common law, its inevitable gaps must necessarily be filled by judicial construction, and
some codes expressly refer to analogy as a guide. Only for
the criminal codes this principle seems now generally repudiated ("indla poena sine lege"); we find analogy first expressly
excluded by the Austrian Criminal Code of 1787.
Giny, the most philosophical expounder of French theories
of interpretation, is a strong advocate of the principle of liberality, both by way of extension and by way of exception, where
a legislative policy is not emphatically expressed, and we gather
from his observations that the practice of the courts is more
liberal in that respect than the opinion of text writers. Thus
he refers to the opinion "so widely held by writers ('doctrine'),
in spite of the unceasing protests on the part of the courts
('jurisprudence'), which, in the absence of a specific provision,
relentlessly and indiscriminately denies any legal effect to transactions between an apparent heir and parties dealing with him
in good faith," and he condemns a "brutal analysis of statutes,"
presupposing the plenitude and perfection of the written law."'
No English or American court or lawyer would think it possible to protect the bona fide purchaser from an heir against a
subsequently discovered devisee, in the absence of special protective legislation, such as is found in New York and Massachusetts.
Perhaps it is true that Anglo-American jurisprudence is
exceptionally strict in accepting the logical consequences of
legal rules and principles whether the results accord with a sense
of equity or not, and maintains that attitude equally towards
statutes and the common law. If so, this is probably due to
the heightened sense of responsibility which is created by the
consciousness of great judicial power, and which makes it a
deliberate policy to disclaim any semblance of arbitrary discretion.
- For a discussion of "Judicial Powers of Interpretation Under Foreign
Codes," see 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 39.
-

CGny, See. 6.
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English text writers refer to the greater spirit of freedom
manifested by the courts of Scotland toward the legislation of
that country, and it has been said of Hungary, that it was an
established tradition that judges were entitled to improve bad
laws. The operation of the rule of precedents undoubtedly
tends to bind interpretation by law.
Conceding that this spirit of interpretation is part and
parcel of our law, it may yet be urged that in cases of genuine
ambiguity courts should use the power of interpretation consciously and deliberately to promote sound law and sound principles of legislation. That object is far more important than
a painstaking fidelity to the supposed legislative intent. This
intent is in reality often a fiction, and the legislature is fully
aware that any but the most explicit language is subject to the
judicial power of interpretation. That power might, therefore,
as well be frankly and vigorously used as a legitimate instrument of legal development and of balancing legislative inadvertence by judicial deliberation. English and American legal
sentiment, however, is decidely against the exercise of such
judicial power, which is strongly advocated by new .schools
of jurisprudence in France and Germany, and it seems -strange
to find German writers refer to the power of English judges as
a model to be followed in Germany.
Ernst Freund.
University of Chicago Law School.
'Note the references to a supposed "Richterkbniglum" (judge-kingship)
in England by so eminent a German publicist as Adickes, the former Mayor
of Frankfort on the Main. A recent civil law writer regards the English and
American judge-made law as an extension by analogy of the statute law which
"according to the prevailing English theory" is the basis of the application

of law! (Professor Kiss in iheringsJahrbNicher,Vol. 58, p. 484)t
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